Morale
"I am sick and disgusted with this life... this is simply a living death [1]."
– Sgt. Edward Davies, 315th Regiment
Aside from the disorganization and unpreparedness of several American units during and before the offensive, morale became a problem for troops as it decayed on all sides. After continuous “bloody frontal attacks against determined German defenders,” divisions such as the 35th, 79th, and 92nd were “on the brink of combat ineffectiveness” as many men roamed elsewhere or deserted their positions [2].
For these troops, morality had reached an abysmal level; it was one that concerned inspector general Major C.H. Rice who once reported, “I do not believe the fighting power of the Division is very great [3].” Although morality was undoubtedly observed, scholar Richard Faulkner argues it was not easy to define. This, along with the indescribable nature of combat, is part of the reason why it is difficult to encapsulate all of the different factors that contribute to a battle. With human experiences and personal accounts, however, we can understand the unchanging nature of war and its mental toll on individuals. |
Combat Morale
Although efforts to sustain soldiers' general morality were implemented throughout the war – let alone the offensive –, combat morale was often overlooked. Faulkner describes this as the "individual and collective ability to endure physical, psychological, and moral shocks" of accepting one's own losses and killing his enemies [4]. Small unit cohesion – whether in a squad or platoon – intertwined with combat morale, depending on soldiers' mutual trust, camaraderie, confidence, and training.
Due to heavy casualties, unexperienced leadership, and poor personnel policies, however, a crisis in morale affected AEF forces, especially during the second phase. Major General Liggett once reported that approximately 100,000 straggled from their assigned units during the first month of the offensive. Considering that between 900,000 to 1.2 million Americans participated in this campaign, nearly one in ten soldiers were absent during combat [5].
Due to heavy casualties, unexperienced leadership, and poor personnel policies, however, a crisis in morale affected AEF forces, especially during the second phase. Major General Liggett once reported that approximately 100,000 straggled from their assigned units during the first month of the offensive. Considering that between 900,000 to 1.2 million Americans participated in this campaign, nearly one in ten soldiers were absent during combat [5].
"It is difficult to understand why men who have been at the front – who have been, perhaps, badly wounded – as so anxious to come up again... The magnet that drew me back to the front was the desire to see my friends again – to see what they are doing, to learn what they had done, to find what had happened to so and so, to be glad that another friend was still alive and well [6]." |
Sources
- Edward G. Lengel, To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 150.
- Richard S. Faulkner, “‘There is a Limit to Human Endurance:’ The Challenges to Morale in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign” in A Companion to the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, ed. Edward G. Lengel (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2014), 287.
- Faulkner, "'There is a Limit to Human Endurance,'" 288.
- Faulkner, "'There is a Limit to Human Endurance,'" 290.
- Faulkner, "'There is a Limit to Human Endurance,'" 298-299.
- Faulkner, "'There is a Limit to Human Endurance,'" 302.